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INTRODUCTION: THE GROWTH OF OUTSOURCING 
Firms as diverse as Nokia, Sun Microsystems, IBM, Mattel, Boeing and Calvin Klein all engage 
in extensive outsourcing.  Sun, for example, currently purchases around seventy five percent of its 
components from external suppliers (Domberger, 1999).  Outsourcing grew rapidly during the 1990s 
(Bryce and Useem, 1998) and has now become an accepted dimension of corporate strategy.  Estimates 
currently put the market value of outsourcing in the United States at between $200 and $300 billion  
(Greer, Youngblood and Gray, 1999; Dun and Bradstreet, 2000).  While outsourcing continues to grow in 
importance, the nature and focus of outsourcing is evolving.  Historically, most outsourcing took place in 
manufacturing industries, but it is now spreading rapidly within service industries.  Whether in 
manufacturing or services, outsourcing is becoming increasingly cross-national and global (e.g., Gopal, 
2003; Palvia, 2003).  For example, it is estimated that only approximately forty percent of the production 
value of a North American-made automobile now comes from the U.S. and much of this offshore supply 
is outsourced. The growth of international outsourcing has accentuated controversy surrounding trade 
liberalization efforts in developed economies, especially in the United States.   
The nature of outsourcing is very diverse.  Some firms now outsource core primary activities 
along the value chain (“operations” in Porter’s terminology [Porter, 1985]) so extensively that they no 
longer engage in production, as it is traditionally understood (Tisdale, 1994; Tempest, 1996).  Inbound 
and outbound logistics are also being extensively outsourced (Knemeyer et al., 2003; Zsidisin, 2003).  
Other firms are extensively outsourcing secondary value chain activities such as information technology, 
accounting systems, distribution, aspects of human resources management and R&D (Cross, 1995; 
Johnson and Schneider, 1995; Lacity and Willcocks, 1998; Stroh and Treehuboff, 2003; Odagiri, 2003; 
Ono, 2003).
1   
In spite of the increasing importance of outsourcing, many firms appear not to have a clear 
understanding of the benefits and costs of outsourcing, apart from a general idea that it will save resources 
                         
1 For a framework that includes value “shops” and “networks” as well as chains, see Stabell and Fjeldstad (1998). 3 
or acquire capabilities and allow them to focus on core competencies (Smith et al., 1998).  Yet 
outsourcing involves significant costs.  The outsourcing firm is inevitably placing at least part of its 
destiny in the hands of other firms that are seeking to maximize their profits.  Thus, in spite of the fact 
that outsourcing is often described as a “strategic alliance” or in other co-operative terminology, the 
parties to the outsourcing contract inevitably have conflicting interests to some extent (Lacity and 
Hirschheim, 1995)
2.   
In order to outsource intelligently, the firm must understand both the potential benefits and costs 
of outsourcing and the specific drivers of those benefits and costs.  To do so, the firm must have a clear 
conceptual understanding of the outsourcing decision.  The strategic objective of outsourcing decision 
makers should be to seek to maximize the net benefits of outsourcing relative to in-house provision of 
value-chain activities. In practice, this can often be simplified to minimizing the total costs of “receiving” 
any given quantity and quality of outsourced good or activity.  The crucial point is that costs must be 
viewed comprehensively.  Costs consist of expenditures for the good itself and the costs associated with 
"governing" the outsourcing transaction.  This raises a number of fundamental questions relating to 
governance costs.  How can the firm assess ex ante the potential governance costs that arise with 
outsourcing?  How, and under what circumstances, can governance costs be reduced?   
The chapter first presents a framework for assessing outsourcing benefits and costs from the 
firm’s perspective; second, we identify the specific governance costs associated with outsourcing; third, 
we delineate the three major determinants of outsourcing governance costs:  product/activity complexity, 
contestability and asset specificity; fourth, we present four standard potential outsourcing situations and 
suggest appropriate responses for each; finally, we present some brief conclusions relating to the 
contingent nature of the potential net benefits of outsourcing. 
                         
2 Tapon (1989) argues that pharmaceutical firms are more willing to outsource R&D to university laboratories 
because they are non-profit organizations and, therefore, less likely to have a financial conflict of interest with for-
profit pharmaceutical firms. 4 
THE BENEFITS FROM OUTSOURCING 
There is emerging evidence that investors usually expect outsourcing to create value for 
shareholders (Hayes et al., 2000).  The broad purpose of outsourcing is to: (1) lower the purchase price of 
some input by taking advantage of external suppliers’ lower costs, or (2) improve the quality of one or 
more inputs by purchasing some superior resource or capability from an external supplier.  In either case, 
the supplier’s advantage will be one that is not easily imitable.  If the firm could easily imitate the cost or 
capability advantage of potential outside suppliers, it could easily bring the production of the activity “in-
house”.  Both direct cost savings and the acquisition of superior capabilities can be thought of, and 
described, in cost-saving terms – superior capabilities could only be produced at the same quality within 
the firm at a higher unit cost.  However, it is usual in the business strategy literature to analyze each 
specific activity on the value chain in terms of the firm’s ability to lower cost or to improve quality (or, 
more broadly, to in some way to differentiate their production process).  We follow that distinction in the 
following discussion of the potential benefits of outsourcing. 
Cost-Reducing Rationales for Outsourcing 
The costs that must be compared are the costs of internal production of the activity to the cost if 
the activity is outsourced.  Production costs are directly generated by the opportunity costs of the 
resources—land, labor and capital—actually used to produce the good.  Of course, it is impossible to 
design firms to take advantage of economies of scale for all inputs – even the largest global 
pharmaceutical firms do not manufacture their own computers.  Many inputs are inevitably outsourced.  
In practice, inputs that can be bought in highly competitive “spot” markets – “off-the-shelf” purchases -- 
raise few outsourcing issues.  Therefore, outsourcing is really only a further step on the continuum from 
purchasing and procurement.       
There are a number of cost-related reasons for considering outsourcing.  The most basic reason 
for outsourcing is that in-house production of the activity entails production at too low levels to be 
efficient; that is, to achieve minimum efficient scale (McFetridge and Smith, 1988; Lyons, 1995).  Many 
goods and services for which the organization has low unit demand exhibit significant cost “lumpiness”, 5 
holding quality constant (Loh and Venkatraman, 1992; McFarlan and Nolan, 1995).  An independent 
specialized producer selling to multiple (outsourcing) buyers can achieve minimum efficient scale.  
Economies of scale do not apply only to the core operations (production) of a firm: the most significant 
economies of scale may relate to secondary value chain activities such as administrative and information 
systems, knowledge and learning, access to capital markets and marketing (Muris et al., 1992; Veugelers 
and Cassiman, 1999).  For example, a major rationale for the significant degree of outsourcing of 
information systems is the inability of firms to achieve minimum efficient scale in either installing, 
updating or managing these systems (McLellan, 1993).   
Similarly, and closely related to economies of scale, economies of scope are becoming a rationale 
for outsourcing.  With the advent of flexible manufacturing (Greenwood, 1988), the potential to achieve 
economies of scope has increased dramatically (Pine, 1993).  Firms that produce a range of products that 
can utilize the same production equipment have a significant cost advantage that they can pass on to 
customers (Besanko et al., 2001; Morrison, 2003).  Smaller firms, therefore, in a single line of business 
will often not be able to achieve the same marginal production costs. Also closely related to an economy 
of scale rationale is the potential to change large fixed capital costs into variable costs (Quelin and 
Duhamel, 2003).  For example, semiconductor plants (“foundries”) that approach minimum efficient scale 
cost approximately a billion dollars.  Capital-constrained smaller firms cannot access such capital. Even 
when they can, committing those funds might crowd out more critical investments. 
Recent theories of the “boundary choices” of firms emphasize that the optimal scale and scope of 
a firm depend on the degree to which new undertakings are specific to the firm’s existing asset base 
(Poppo and Zenger, 1998). That is, the relatedness of the undertakings ultimately conditions the net 
benefits of locating the relevant undertakings within or outside the firm. Relatedness can extend beyond 
technological similarities to include shared management knowledge and even a common language. 
Nevertheless, a relatively large and indivisible scale of required investment combined with rationing of 
financial capital may limit the ability of firms to exploit relatedness across activities. 6 
Other economic cost-based rationales for outsourcing include superior external supplier 
economies of learning or experience (Hayes and Wheelwright, 1984), superior ability to introduce new 
technologically superior product generations quickly, and at low cost, and superior capacity utilization 
(Morrison, 2003). When work force demands are unevenly distributed over time, it may be cheaper for 
firms to outsource the work involved rather than lay-off and rehire workers (Abraham and Taylor, 1996).  
There are also organizational factors relating to cost that suggest a rationale for considering 
outsourcing.  Most importantly, in many organizations, especially large multi-unit organizations, there is 
a tendency for internal production units to act as if they are monopolists (Alles et al., 1998).  Monopoly-
like behaviour blunts efficiency incentives by reducing comparative performance benchmarks for internal 
customers and by making it less likely that a good is efficiently priced in the internal firm market, thereby 
obscuring the efficiency of the internal supply unit.  Inefficient internal prices can arise for two reasons.  
First, the internal production unit may be an efficient low-cost producer, but prices internally as a 
monopolist – production unit managers are usually responsible for this problem (Reichelstein, 1995; 
Vining, 2003).  Second, the production unit may not have sufficient incentives to achieve the minimum 
production costs that are technically feasible.  As a result, they allow production costs to “drift” upwards 
– either managers or employees or both may be responsible for this syndrome (Leibenstein, 1976; Button 
and Weyman-Jones, 1994).  Competition, that is the absence of monopoly, is normally the crucial driver 
in forcing down production costs to their lowest level.  Profit-maximizing firms in a competitive market 
will be forced to price at the lowest possible marginal cost, thus eliminating inefficient practices.  
Monopolistic internal production units may not be subject to this same level of competition.  (Although 
firms can simulate such competition by forcing different internal units to bid against each other for 
production rights.)  This rationale for outsourcing might be a more important reason for outsourcing than 
minimum efficient scale issues, especially for larger, bureaucratized firms. 
An additional organizational-cost reason for outsourcing is that internal production of an input 
may generate significant organizational negative externalities (or more accurately “internalities”, as they 
are internal to the organization) that can be reduced or eliminated by outsourcing.  (Conversely, as 7 
discussed below, outsourcing can also generate negative externalities for the outsourcing firm.)  Internal 
production of an input, for example, may require a distinct corporate culture that is dysfunctional for the 
rest of the organization (Camerer and Vepsalainen, 1988).  Similarly, firms can experience diseconomies 
of scope in management of multiple firm activities or diseconomies of scale in producing a single activity 
(Graves and Langowitz, 1993; Zenger, 1994).   
Finally, cost savings can result from altering obligations that a firm faces under government laws 
and regulations or under agreements with labour unions. As an example, firms may be obliged to pay 
health care benefits to workers classified as “full-time”, whereas part-time workers are not entitled to the 
same level of benefits. Outsourcing specific activities may enable firms to “re-hire” the same or similar 
workers from external suppliers as part-time or temporary employees. To be sure, if labour markets are 
reasonably competitive and not segmented, such cost savings may prove to be only temporary. Market 
forces will force supplying contractors to pay higher wages to their employees to compensate them for the 
absence of health care benefits. These suppliers, in turn, will pass the higher wage costs on to those firms 
hiring the workers on a temporary basis.
3
There is evidence from a variety of sources that outsourcing can lower production costs.  Clearly, 
the anticipation of various kinds of cost saving is a major driver of outsourcing (Lacity and Hirshheim, 
1993; McFarlan and Nolan, 1995; Kakabadse and Kakabadsee, 2002; Quelin and Duhamel, 2003) 
however, as noted by Leiblin et al., (2002) and other commentators, there is relatively little hard empirical 
evidence that comes from contexts where firms outsource to other firms.  The limited evidence in part 
reflects the difficulty in measuring production and other cost savings (Bryce and Useem, 1998). 
Nevertheless, Ang (1998) found that a large sample of banks that outsource primarily considered 
production cost savings in their decisions, and there is some evidence to suggest that this finding is 
generalizable (Walker and Weber, 1987; Lyons, 1995; Benson and Ieronimo, 1996; Saunders et al., 
1997). Much of the best empirical evidence comes from outsourcing by government to private suppliers.  
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strengthened employers’ incentives to contract-out low-skill tasks to firms not offering health benefits. 8 
Empirical studies tend to find in this outsourcing context that production cost savings are approximately 
in the 20% range, especially if competitive bidding is used (Vining and Globerman, 1999; Hodge, 2000). 
As we discuss below, a crucial point is that even those empirical studies that have examined the 
relative production costs of internal provision versus outsourcing have not included the costs of governing 
the outsourcing relationship, specifically, bargaining and opportunism costs, which a priori might be 
expected to be higher with outsourcing.  Indeed, some governance mechanisms for outsourcing can be 
expected to raise production costs -- for example if cost-plus contracts are used (McAfee and McMillan, 
1988; Ulset, 1996).   
Differentiation (Quality) Rationales for Outsourcing 
  Firm-specific resources and capabilities are becoming increasingly recognized as the drivers of 
competitive success (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1986).  Capabilities that are difficult to imitate, or, at the 
extreme, cannot be imitated, are therefore the key to sustainable competitive advantage (Barney, 1991).  
The capability may be inimitable for a wide range of reasons.  Barney (1999) points out that the firm 
could attempt to acquire the capabilities through internal development or by acquiring a firm that already 
has the capability; however, it may be very costly or impossible to do either.  Four reasons why it may be 
costly to develop a capability internally are: (1) unique historical conditions that no longer exist; (2) path 
dependency; (3) social complexity, and (4) “causal ambiguity” resulting from the difficulty of knowing 
what is the source of the capability (Barney, 1999: 140-1).  Five reasons why it may be costly to acquire a 
firm that has the capability are: (1) legal constraints; (2) acquisition itself might negate the capability; (3) 
acquisition may be costly to reverse if the capability turns out not to be valuable; (4) there may be 
undesirable characteristics that offset the valuable capability, and (5) integrating the capability into the 
acquiring firm may be difficult both because of causal ambiguity and implementation problems (Barney, 
1999: 142-3).   
Whatever the reasons for inimitability, a firm producing a given product or service that requires a 
capability has to decide whether to compete with a firm that has a given capability or to attempt to 
purchase the higher quality input from them.  If the capability is critical to the success of their product 9 
(that is, a “core competency”) the firm may have no choice but to attempt to acquire the capability 
internally, although some commentators disagree even with this assessment (Baden-Fuller et al., 2000) 
But, if it is not developed internally, the firm may be able to acquire the capability through outsourcing.  
Historically, for example, many firms have outsourced specialized legal services and advertising.  The 
evidence suggests that this rationale for outsourcing is increasing (Quinn and Hilmer, 1994; Farrell et al., 
1998; Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2003).  Specifically, Quelin and Duhamel (2003: 649) argue that “cost 
reductions, while important, are but one objective expected from outsourcing. Other objectives include 
improved flexibility, quality and control”. 
Again, as with cost-reducing rationales for outsourcing, the systematic empirical evidence of the 
value of outsourcing for improving quality is still quite limited.  Gilley and Rasheed (2000) and Gilley et 
al. (2004) have recently found evidence that outsourcing various aspects of human resources management 
can innovation although they did not find direct evidence of financial performance improvements.  
Leiblein et al., (2002) present evidence that there are benefits from outsourcing, but they are contingent 
on the specific attributes of the contractual relationship, both in terms of the nature of the activity to be 
outsourced and the governance response by the firm. 
We turn to a consideration of governance costs that may potentially offset the cost-lowering or 
differentiating-enhancing benefits of outsourcing. 
THE AGGREGATE COSTS OF OUTSOURCING 
Direct purchase cost savings or superior resources may be more than offset by increases in 
governance costs.
4  Governance costs are any costs in addition to production/purchase costs.  Two types 
of governance costs are relevant in the choice between internal production of an activity and outsourcing: 
bargaining costs and opportunism costs.  Bargaining costs include the following kinds of costs: (1) costs 
arising from negotiating contract details per se; (2) the costs of negotiating changes to the contract in the 
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post-contract stage when unforeseen circumstances arise; (3) the costs of monitoring whether 
performance is being adhered to by the other party, and (4) the costs of disputes which arise if neither 
party wishes to utilize pre-agreed-to resolution mechanisms, especially “contract breaking” mechanisms.  
While only the first bargaining cost is experienced at the time of contracting (the others are experienced 
subsequent to outsourcing), virtually all of these bargaining costs can be anticipated and dealt with at the 
time of contracting. 
Bargaining Costs   
Bargaining costs arise when both parties are acting with self-interest, but in good faith 
(Williamson, 1985).  The incremental bargaining costs of outsourcing are significant.  An advantage of 
"internalizing" an activity is that bargaining costs over the distribution of costs within the firm are 
normally lower.  However, bargaining within organizations -- for example over wages, bonuses or 
internal transfer prices – can be costly (Alles et al., 1998); thus it is incremental bargaining costs of 
outsourcing that are relevant.  Recent empirical evidence suggests that bargaining costs are higher with 
external suppliers (Simester and Knez, 2002). In this regard, it might be noted that bargaining costs 
include costs associated directly or indirectly with communication between external suppliers and 
outsourcers. In this regard, technological change and deregulation have arguably reduced communication 
and transportation costs, especially for international transactions, and have thereby encouraged 
international outsourcing (MacPherson and Pritchard, 2002).  
Opportunism Costs  
“Opportunism” is any behavior by a party to a transaction designed to change the agreed terms of 
a transaction to be more in its favor.  Opportunism costs arise when at least one party acts self-
interestedly, but in bad faith.  Opportunism is more likely in outsourcing contexts than in transactions 
within organizations, since the distribution of profit is more relevant in dealings between organizations.  
Additionally, employees within organizations have better and more numerous opportunities to "pay back" 
(and, therefore, discourage) opportunistic fellow employees.  Opportunism, however, can also occur 
within organizations (Alles et al., 1998; Vining, 2003).  Therefore, again it is incremental opportunism 11 
costs, which are relevant.  Opportunism is usually considered to be more likely after the outsourcing 
contract has taken place, but some behaviors prior to contracting also have "opportunism-like" 
characteristics. 
Although it is possible analytically to make a clear distinction between bargaining and 
opportunism costs, in practice, they are difficult to distinguish -- it is almost always in the interest of 
opportunistic suppliers to claim that their behavior results from an unexpected change in circumstances 
(i.e. uncertainty).  Frequently, the outsourcing firm cannot tell whether this claim is genuine or not. The 
inability to distinguish between legitimate bargaining and opportunism itself raises outsourcing costs. 
Moreover, making such distinctions is likely to be even more difficult in cases of international 
outsourcing where language and cultural differences may impede mutual efforts to identify and remedy 
sources of disputes. 
In summary, the firm should seek the regime that minimizes the sum of its production, bargaining 
and opportunism costs.  Ideally, strategic managers then compare those estimated costs with the costs of 
internalization, that is, the cost of the firm producing the good itself.   
THE DETERMINANTS OF OUTSOURCING COSTS 
Three major factors are likely to determine the sum of bargaining and opportunism costs:  
product/activity complexity, contestability, and asset specificity.
5  We discuss each of these in turn. 
Product/Activity Complexity 
Product (service) or activity complexity largely determines the degree of difficulty in specifying 
and monitoring the terms and conditions of a transaction (“activity” simply refers to outsourced inputs 
that cannot easily be described as goods or services).  Goods, services or activities can be approximately 
divided into search goods, experience goods and post-experience goods (Vining and Weimer, 1988).  A 
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good is a search good if its price-performance (quality) characteristics are known before the 
“outsourcing” decision is made.  Indeed, as mentioned earlier, such decisions are normally not even 
thought of as outsourcing – the purchase of ballpoint pens is simply purchasing or procurement.  A good 
is an experience good if its price-performance characteristics are approximately known almost 
immediately after purchase.  For example, assessing the quality of food served by a supplier is relatively 
easy at the time of consumption.  A good is a post-experience good if its price-performance 
characteristics cannot be assessed for a considerable time (if ever, when full revelation is dependent on 
contingent events) after the outsourcing decision.  Measuring the price-performance characteristics of a 
complex good such as R&D is difficult (Ulset, 1996; Tapon and Cadsby, 1996).  Unique and/or new (to 
the outsourcing firm) goods are almost always complex. 
The degree of product/activity complexity largely determines: (1) the uncertainty surrounding the 
contract (this effects both contracting parties equally) which raises the probability that bounded 
rationality will come into play (Williamson, 1985); (2) the potential for information asymmetry (the 
probability that one party to the contract will have information that the other party does not have); and (3) 
the probability that there will be externalities that will affect other firm activities.   
Complex goods involve uncertainty about the nature and costs of the production process itself. 
This is partly because the production of complex goods is more likely to be affected by unforeseen 
changes in the external environment (Collingridge, 1992).  Greater uncertainty raises bargaining costs, 
both during contract negotiations and post-contract.  Information asymmetry occurs when one party has 
relevant information that the other party does not.   While information asymmetry does not always raise 
costs, it usually does, especially if a contract involves post-experience goods.  High task complexity 
raises the probability that there will be information asymmetry, because it implies specialized knowledge 
or assets whose characteristics are only initially known to external suppliers or other experts. Information 
asymmetry, thus, raises the probability that a party to the transaction can behave opportunistically. 
Opportunism arising from information asymmetry can occur either at the contract negotiation stage 
(typically when there is information asymmetry and low contestability) or at the post-contract stage, but is 13 
most likely to be significant post-contract.  Either the outsourcing firm or the external supplier may 
generate these costs.  Higher task complexity also increase the potential for production externalities, that 
is the potential for serious disruption to the rest of the firm if the outsourced service is withdrawn or 
degraded (Globerman, 1995).  From the outsourcing firm’s standpoint, product/activity complexity raises 
costs, both because there is substantial uncertainty surrounding the transaction, and because potential 
external suppliers often have more information about attributes of the relevant transactions.  The 
associated concern is that it may be very difficult for outsourcing firms to ensure that the quality of 
services provided is appropriately high.   
The empirical evidence supports the idea that product complexity raises the probability of internal 
production.  Masten (1984), for example, found that more complex components for the aerospace industry 
were more likely to be produced internally than to be outsourced.  Mowery and Rosenberg (1989) found 
that R&D outsourcing is more likely to occur for less complex functions such as material testing and 
process invention and less for product innovation.  Jensen and Rothwell (1998) found that nuclear power 
plants were less likely to outsource “production-critical” activities that are complex and where the quality 
is more difficult to assess before a problem occurs.  Veugelers and Cassiman (1999) found that 
complexity leads Belgium manufacturing firms to reduce the probability of them relying exclusively on 
external technology sourcing. Novak and Eppinger (2001) found a significant and positive relationship 
between product complexity and internalization in the automobile industry.   
Contestability 
The number of firms that can supply a product or service affects the likelihood that the 
outsourcing firm will purchase on the “spot” market.  Hubbard (2001), for example, found that in long 
haul trucking markets doubling the thickness of the market increases the probability that spot contracts 
will be used by around thirty percent.  Besanko et al., (2001) found that firms in commodity industries 
(where competition is greater) pass on marginal cost reductions more than firms in industries with more 
differentiated products and services.  Ono (2003) found that U.S. manufacturing firms are more likely to 
outsource advertising, bookkeeping, accounting and legal services the larger the size of the supplying 14 
market.
6  Finally, Leiblein et al., (2002) found that firms in the semiconductor industry produce in-house 
when they are few suppliers and outsource when there are many. 
In many contexts, the competitive structure of the market may be less important than its 
contestability.  A contestable market is one where only a few firms are immediately available to provide 
any given service, but many other firms would quickly become available if the price paid by the 
outsourcing firm exceeded the average cost incurred by external suppliers.  For example, the markets for 
basic accounting and payroll services are highly contestable as many firms have the basic capabilities to 
supply such services, even if they are not currently doing so.  The degree of contestability may, in some 
cases, be more important than the number of firms actually providing a given service (Baumol et al., 
1982). 
In some circumstances the market for the service in question may be competitive -- there may be 
a considerable number of firms in the relevant (usually geographic) market producing the service, or a 
very close substitute.  In this case, potential entry by new suppliers may offer little additional discipline 
on the behavior of incumbent potential external suppliers. 
The degree to which the activity being outsourced is contestable affects opportunism costs.  If the 
market for the activity is contestable, opportunism is reduced at the contract stage and, potentially, at the 
post-contract stage.  Low contestability raises different issues in the contract and post-contract phases.  
During contract negotiations, a potential external supplier in a market with limited contestability is 
tempted to offer services at a price above marginal cost (or average cost in circumstances where average 
cost is declining for the demanded good). This higher price can be thought of as a bargaining cost, 
because it is a direct result of outsourcing. 
At the post-contract stage, low contestability increases the risks of opportunism (and associated 
costs) facing the other party for two reasons: first, because a external supplier cannot be quickly replaced 
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(temporal specificity) and second, because there is a heightened risk of “contract breach externalities”.  
This risk is especially relevant when the external supplier provides services that are related to a network 
of some kind within the outsourcing firm.  For example, an external firm carrying out payroll operations 
may threaten to withdraw service, jeopardizing the payment of all payroll paychecks.  This could 
effectively shut down the firm.  Contexts where firms fear breach externalities are often defined as 
"strategic” systems.  However, firms do not eliminate these externality problems by producing the good 
or activity themselves. As the FedEx strike in the United States graphically illustrated, employees can 
also opportunistically hold-up employers by withdrawing essential services (passive breach) or by 
picketing and various forms of sabotage (active breach). 
The evidence suggests that some firms have unintentionally contributed to contestability 
problems.  If potential suppliers perceive that outsourcing firms are soliciting “unreasonably low” bids 
and/or are arbitrarily requiring rebids at lower-than-originally agreed to prices, a competitive market may 
not emerge.  Similarly some outsourcing firms dampen competition by encouraging excessive 
specialization by suppliers.  This reduces supplier firms’ switching capacity in the face of unsatisfactory 
performance.  External suppliers will, in turn, incorporate the increased risk of being tied to specific 
buyers in higher prices for their services.  This latter point underscores the need for firms to think broadly 
about the cost consequences of specific outsourcing strategies.  Short-run cost savings, and even 
improvements in quality, associated with economies of specialization, may be achieved at the expense of 
higher long-run costs.  
In contrast, in many cases it is possible for outsourcing firms to deliberately enhance competition 
by expanding the size of the relevant geographic market.  This is certainly an important impetus for the 
explosive growth of cross-national outsourcing (Feenstra, 1998).  Such a strategy is less feasible if 
contestability problems are not so much the result of sunk cost investments, per se, but of the 
geographical specificity of the relevant assets.  
Another potential approach to mitigating competition problems is for the outsourcing firm to own 
the (sunk cost) assets and for the external firm to own only relatively fungible assets.  Thus, the 16 
outsourcing firm retains formal ownership of relatively specialized and expensive equipment, which is 
leased to the external supplier.  In this way, the need for potential new suppliers to make large sunk-cost 
investments can be mitigated and contestability enhanced. 
Finally, contestability is also a function of the capability of the firm to bring the service back in-
house (“backsourcing”).  In order to effectively outsource, firms must retain a “core” employee capacity 
anyway.  If this capacity can be readily expanded because there are trained specialists available, the 
outsourcing firm can credibly threaten backsourcing.  There is evidence that more firms are taking 
seriously, and investing in, backsourcing capabilities (Hirshheim, 1998). 
In sum, neither economies-of-scale or the need for sunk-cost investments are the main barriers to 
contestability.  In particular, if either outsourcing firms or external suppliers are mobile, small numbers of 
competitors need not eliminate competition.  If they are not mobile, the problem is better evaluated as one 
of geographic asset specificity.  Indeed, for the remainder of this paper, we assume that contestability can 
be achieved in all cases.  
Asset Specificity 
An asset is "specific" if it makes a necessary contribution to the production of a good and it has 
much lower value in alternative uses.  There are various kinds of specificity including physical asset 
specificity, location specificity, human asset specificity, dedicated assets (Williamson, 1985:55) and 
temporal specificity (Masten et al., 1991:9; Pirrong, 1993). Whatever the form of asset specificity, the 
issue is basically the same: agreements which require either party to employ assets (usually capital assets, 
but in some circumstances human capital assets) that have little or no alternative use, that is, are "sunk", 
raise the potential for opportunism.  The contracting party who commits assets is vulnerable to hold-up 
(Shelanski and Klein, 1995; Ulset, 1996).  No matter what prices are agreed to in the contracting stage, 17 
the other party can behave opportunistically by reneging and offering lower prices that only cover 
incremental costs.
7
Extensive empirical evidence suggests that asset specificity reduces the degree of outsourcing (for 
a review, see Vining and Globerman, 1999; for some recent empirical examples, also see Ang, 1998; 
Gonzalez-Diaz et al., 2000; Saussier, 2000; Hubbard, 2001; Azoulay, 2002; Leiblein et al., 2002).  
Intermediate levels of asset specificity, when not leading to complete internalization, leads to long-term 
exclusive contracts (e.g., Joskow, 1987; Pirrong, 1993).   
Although bargaining and opportunism costs can occur during contracting (period 1) or post-
contractually (period 2), it is feasible and desirable for the outsourcing firm to address both these costs at 
the contracting stage (that is, in period 1).  The parties are conceptually in a multi-period game 
(Rasmussen, 1994).  The outsourcing "player" should anticipate what the optimal strategy in each period 
of the game will be for the external supplier player and by backward induction identify its own optimal 
strategy in each period.  For example, suppose the outsourcing firm is playing a game where 
contestability is high in period 1, but is expected to be low in any subsequent periods.  Outsourcing firms, 
therefore, should be able to predict that an external supplier will behave opportunistically or generate 
bargaining costs in some subsequent period.  The outsourcing firm should, therefore, incorporate this 
expectation into its period 1 strategy.  The optimal result is an initial contract that anticipates and 
addresses all potential opportunism costs and bargaining costs. 
OUTSOURCING SITUATIONS AND SOME POSSIBLE STRATEGIES 
The practical value of the “game” analogy is to emphasize that firms must formulate consistent 
expectations about future outsourcing issues and plan accordingly.  In order to do so, however, 
outsourcing firms must think through the factors influencing opportunism and bargaining costs as well as 
strategies to minimize costs.  Thus, it is useful to distinguish between ex ante mechanisms and ex post 
                         
7 As Pirrong (1993) notes, sunk costs can generate opportunism even where no contract has been signed, if a party 
has committed resources whose values would be reduced if the transaction were not consummated.   18 
mechanisms to minimize costs, emphasizing that in the case of the latter, it is only the “trigger” that is ex 
post.  To some managers this advice may seem abstract, but recent evidence from an extensive survey of 
information technology outsourcing suggests that detailed contract specification is the leading predictor 
of outsourcing firm satisfaction (Lacity and Willcocks, 1998). Leiblein et al., (2002) also find that 
performance outcomes are crucially dependent on taking seriously the factors described above in 
determining whether, and how, to outsource (see also Gopal et al., 2003). 
This is not to say that managers should ordinarily strive for “fully complete” contracts. There are 
obviously costs as well as benefits to establishing a complete contract. A contract can be seen as being 
more complete than another contract if it gives a more precise definition of the transaction and of the 
means to carry it out (Saussier, 2000). The costs of striving for more completeness include the bargaining 
costs described earlier, as well as the costs of acquiring information requisite to undertaking 
comprehensive contracting. 
We now apply the framework to various combinations of product complexity and asset specificity 
(remembering that contestability problems can be treated as being ultimately co-extensive with asset 
specificity problems).  We consider possible combinations of these two characteristics with the goal of 
illustrating the conceptual framework rather than providing a definitive guide to all outsourcing issues.
8
Low Product/Activity Complexity and Low Asset Specificity 
This combination provides the clearest case for outsourcing.  It encompasses many standard 
products, services and activities required by the firm.  Outsourcing offers the potential for lower 
production costs for the good or activity, as well as minimal bargaining and opportunism costs.  Low 
product complexity implies that the outsourcing firm has, or can easily acquire, sufficient knowledge and 
information to specify contract terms precisely (as there is low uncertainty about price-performance 
                         
8 Coles and Hesterly (1998) provide evidence that “transactional uncertainty” (complexity) interacts with asset 
specificity to determine the propensity of private hospitals to internalize services. 19 
characteristics and no information asymmetry).  With low asset specificity (and resulting high 
contestability), inefficient or opportunistic external suppliers can be quickly replaced. 
Low Product/Activity Complexity and High Asset Specificity  
Given low complexity, problems associated with high asset specificity almost certainly involve 
high temporal or locational specificity.  There are likely to be few efficiency costs arising from high 
physical asset specificity if the outsourcing firm makes the relevant specific investments itself as, given 
this ownership, it is not costly to replace the external supplier (given high contestability).  There are likely 
to be problems, however, if the external supplier makes the investment.  Once the investment is sunk, an 
external supplier is vulnerable to opportunistic hold-up by the outsourcing firm, which could demand that 
it deliver the good at marginal cost.  Given that all potential external suppliers can deduce this as a 
possible ex post outcome, they will compensate ex ante.  They can compensate in one of two possible 
ways:  either by raising the bid price or by utilizing a higher cost production technology that requires less 
physical asset specificity.
9  Either strategy ultimately raises the outsourcing firm’s costs.  
One way to avoid these problems is for the outsourcing firm to own the specific asset and to rent 
it or lease it to the external firm.  However, leasing specific assets is not costless.  The outsourcing firm is 
now outsourcing two activities -- the original outsourced service and the lease contract (Hensher, 1988).  
Lease contracts can also generate opportunistic behavior, including the potential for the lessee to over-
utilize and run down the leased assets.  Including “reasonable usage and maintenance” clauses can 
mitigate this problem in lease agreements.  But this form of outsourcing, then, requires detailed 
specification of both contracts, adding to costs. 
Another method of dealing with the problem is for the outsourcing firm and the external supplier 
to explicitly share the asset-specific investments, a form of “mutual hostage-holding”.  Jap and Anderson 
(2003) find that such “bilateral idiosyncratic investments” are the most powerful safeguard of high 
performance outcomes. 
                         
9 Lyons (1996) notes the potential for under-investment in transaction-specific assets. 20 
Temporal asset specificity raises several problems (Masten et al., 1991).  The first arises if the 
external supplier fails to provide contracted performance.  The outsourcing firm’s usual insurance against 
the opportunistic exercise of contract breach is an action in tort.  However, this is less desirable than 
having a contract that mitigates breach incentives, especially in the case of transnational outsourcing 
where legal activity is likely to be both more costly and less predictable than in domestic outsourcing.  
The outsourcing firm can, for example, write a contract that contains provisions that backloads payment 
(contract completion bonuses) and requires performance bonding. 
The second possible problem arises if the outsourcing firm wishes to terminate because of 
unsatisfactory performance, but needs to maintain service until a replacement external supplier is in place.  
The risk is that in “endgame” situations external suppliers will act opportunistically.  The most obvious 
way for an outsourcing firm to mitigate this risk is to demand bonding from a winning bidder plus a 
contract agreement that specifies timely arbitration of the firm’s claim for the bond because of 
unsatisfactory contract performance (Eaton and White, 1982).  
High Product/Activity Complexity and Low Asset Specificity 
This configuration perhaps best characterizes the supply of a wide range of services or activities 
that are potentially outsourceable to professionals.  It should be kept in mind, however, when assessing 
potential outsourcing problems that firms’ employment contracts with professional employees are not 
very different from those with formally outsourced professionals.  Basically the same issues arise under 
either arrangement (Garen, 1998; James, 1998).  The main problem is high bargaining costs owing to 
honest disagreements surrounding ex ante specifications, or ex post performance in relationship to ex ante 
specifications.  In particular, disagreements can arise because ex ante specifications are sometimes costly 
and difficult to write, and (therefore) the parties often have difficulty agreeing after the fact about whether 
the specifications were satisfied, and if not, whether the external supplier acted incompetently or 
negligently.  This situation might be particularly relevant in the context of multinational firms where 
management-employee relationships span cultural boundaries, and honest misunderstandings are more apt 
to characterize expectations. However, in this situation opportunism should not be a significant problem, 21 
since low asset specificity implies high contestability, suggesting that switching costs will be low for both 
parties.  Opportunistic behavior once identified can be easily countered by contract termination. A related 
inference one might draw is that short to medium-term contracts with suppliers should be emphasized to 
avoid “contractual strangleholds” (Currie, 1998). 
High Product/Activity Complexity and High Asset Specificity 
The important difference between this situation and the second case discussed above is that 
reliance upon arbitration or other third-party contract enforcement procedures is more problematic 
because it is more difficult for a judging third party to identify whether contract breach has occurred.  
This type of problem has been discussed in the industrial organization literature.  The basic solution 
suggested is that outsourcing firms provide external suppliers with higher than normal profits that they 
can expect to earn indefinitely in the absence of a verified contract breach (Mathewson and Winter, 
1990).  The potential loss of these profits harmonizes the incentives of the firms.   
Table 1 summarizes the relevant issues for each of the four cases described (Vining and 
Globerman, 1999).  The table focuses on two issues:  the dominant problem(s) to be expected and the 
general strategic approach.  The table identifies different combinations of problems and alternative 
instruments to modify each combination.  However, the overall framework emphasizes the following 
steps: (1) Formulate consistent expectations about the uncertainties surrounding the potential transactions 
at all stages of contract formulation and implementation; (2) Identify the potential opportunism at 
different stages of contract formulation and implementation, including the underlying sources: 
contestability, complexity and/or asset specificity; (3) Identify contract provisions to attenuate the 
opportunism and assess the consequences of the preferred strategies for the overall efficiency of 
outsourcing versus internal production, and (4) Implement the relevant strategies prior to the initiation of 
outsourcing. 22 
CONCLUSIONS 
There is increasing interest in outsourcing among firms in a wide range of industries. Moreover, 
there is evidence that outsourcing is becoming increasingly more international, so that the benefits and 
costs of outsourcing are becoming an increasingly important social issue, especially in the United States 
and Western European countries when it involves outsourcing activities to less developed countries. 
Although not dealt with here, as a result outsourcing governance is increasingly likely to include 
managing the political and stakeholder environment.  In this paper, we suggest that many of the potential 
costs associated with outsourcing can be mitigated by contracting and related strategies on the part of the 
outsourcing firm.  We propose a simple framework that relates some alternative strategies for standard 
problem situations surrounding outsourcing.  This framework does not deal with all strategic outsourcing 
issues.  The outsourcing firm also has to develop information strategies so that it can continue to learn – 
about changing costs and other relevant factors (Cross, 1995). 
A strategic approach towards outsourcing must explicitly acknowledge the game-theoretic 
context in which the activity takes place and attempt to condition the environment in order to minimize 
the governance costs associated with outsourcing. It also must recognize that in specific circumstances the 
governance costs will be so high that a firm should not outsource.  This approach is distinct from a 
strategy that emphasizes adaptation or renegotiation in response to conflict with an outsourcing partner 
(Melese, 2000). In this regard, management experts have argued that managers seriously underestimate 
the costs associated with transitioning to a new vendor (Barthelemy, 2001). 
The difficulties and costs associated with implementing a comprehensive strategic approach to 
outsourcing should not be underestimated.  However, it is important to emphasize that there are likely to 
be economies of scale and scope in the outsourcing activity itself. Hence, substantial efficiencies may be 
realized by establishing a group or department specifically devoted to integrating company-wide 
experiences with outsourcing and using the resources in that unit to establish project teams with expertise 
in specific outsourcing activities (Barthelmy, 2001). 23 
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1  Low  Low  Few  Rely Primarily on contestability via 
contract termination (i.e. increase 
potential suppliers). 
 
2  Low  High  Holdup  For physical assets, outsourcing 
firm owns and leases assets; for 
temporal specificity, backloaded 
payments, bonuses and bonding.  
Use of quick arbitration. 
 







Where possible, mutually agreed-
upon practice guidelines. 
4 High  High  Opportunism 
by external 
supplier. 
Harmonize outsourcing firm and 
external supplier incentives through 
“rent-creation”. 
 
* Reproduced with kind permission from European Management Journal. 
 
 